Richard E. Lowe and Beverly Lowe v. Kyle C. Golightly and Kyle C. Golightly dba Kyle C. Golightly Construction : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Richard E. Lowe and Beverly Lowe v. Kyle C.
Golightly and Kyle C. Golightly dba Kyle C.
Golightly Construction : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael L. Black; Attorney for Appellees.
Michael J. Petro; Young & Kester; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Lowe and Lowe v. Golightly, No. 940384 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6036
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD E. LOWE and 
BEVERLY LOWE 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY and 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY dba 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
4 
Case No. 94038/-CA 1 
Priority No. 2 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSON 
Michael L. Black 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 100 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone No. (801) 225-1632 
Attorney for Appellees 
UTAH CO! 
I T " ' ' 
D w .. . w >. i 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. . 
r*~ c? Ar^rftLs 
BriiEF 
fffp3gf 
Michael J. Petro (4241) 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Attorneys at Law 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone No. (801) 489-3294 
Attorneys for Appellants 
FILED 
JAN 2 31995 
MyfiTOFAPPEi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD E. LOWE and 
BEVERLY LOWE 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY and 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY dba 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 940388-CA 
Priority No. 2 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSON 
Michael L. Black 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 100 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone No. (801) 225-1632 
Attorney for Appellees 
Michael J. Petro (4241) 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Attorneys at Law 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone No. (801) 489-3294 
Attorneys for Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS OF FACT WITH REGARD TO THE 
ISSUES IN THIS CASE 2 
POINT II THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE 
INTRODUCTION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO 
MODIFY THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENTS 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES 10 
A. The Contracts Executed by the Parties 
are Integrated and Unambiguous . . . . 10 
B. Improper Extrinsic Evidence was 
Received by the Trial Court 15 
POINT III THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND ARE THEREFORE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 18 
A. The Legal Tests for Challenging the 
Sufficiency of the Trial Courtf s 
Findings 18 
B. The Findings Contained in the 
Courtfs Memorandum Decision are not 
Supported by Admissible Evidence and 
are Clearly Erroneous 18 
CONCLUSION 22 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES Page 
Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 
754 P.2dl230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 18 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 
266 (1972 ) 11 
Colonial Leasing Co., v. Larsen Bros. Const., 
731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) 5 
D.D.Z. v. Molerway Freight Lines, 880 P.2d 1 
(Utah App. Ct. 1994) 3 
Eie v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 
(Utah 1981) 4, 11 
Epstein v. Epstein, 741 P.2d 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 6 
Hal Taylor Assocs., v. Unionamerican, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743 (Utah 1982) 5 
Hansen v. Green River Group, 
748 P. 2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 10 
Interiors Contracting v. Smith, 
881 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 18 
Jensen v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 5 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985) 11 
Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 
1199 (Utah 1983) 3 
Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 
673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983) 6 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 
776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989) 5, 18 
Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 
857 P. 2d 935 (Utah 1993) 17 
State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1993) 2 
State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566 (Utah Ct. App.) 3 
Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985) 4 
Valley Bank v. Cottonwood Wood and Loan Indus., 798 P.2d 
iii 
749 (Utah 1990) 2 
Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 
547 (Utah App. 1991) 5 
Zions First National Bank v. National American 
Title Insurance, 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988) 10 
RULES 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2, 22 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD E. LOWE and 
BEVERLY LOWE 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY and 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY dba 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 940388-CA 
Priority No. 2 
The Appellants submit the following Reply Brief in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellees do not dispute that the trial court failed to 
consider and properly decide the issues relating to the contracts 
signed by the parties. The trial court failed to decide whether 
the contracts were integrated and ambiguous before allowing the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence from the parties regarding 
their dealings. Because the trial court made no rulings with 
regard to the contracts, it is impossible to determine what 
evidence was properly considered by the trial court in deciding 
the merits of the case. The inadequacy of the findings makes it 
impossible to determine what rulings the trial court made with 
regard to the contract and whether those rulings are supportable. 
The documents introduced in this case establish that the 
contracts signed by the parties were fully integrated and 
unambiguous. The trial court should have declined to admit 
evidence that alter or modify the terms of those agreements. 
The Findings of Fact are not supported by admissible 
evidence. The evidence supporting the Findings was inadmissible 
in that it attempted to modify the terms of a fully integrated 
contract. Additionally, the Findings are not sufficiently 
detailed to allow a proper review and are skewed by the trial 
court's use of an erroneous view of the law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS 
OF FACT WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE. 
In Point I of the Appellants' original brief, the Appellants 
contend that the trial court failed to make adequate findings of 
fact with regard to issues in the case. The Appellants relied 
upon the clear language of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which requires a trial court, adjudicating a case 
without a jury, to "find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon . . . ." 
As noted in the original brief, the Utah Appellate Court has 
required that the findings be sufficiently detailed to allow the 
reviewing court the information necessary to review the trial 
court's decision. State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Utah 
1993). 
The Appellant further contends that in a case involving 
issues based on contract, the trial court must determine if the 
contract is integrated and unambiguous before allowing the 
introduction of parole evidence. The clear mandate in that 
regard was provided by the Court in Valley Bank v. Cottonwood 
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Wood & Loan Indus., 798 P.2d 749, 753 (Utah 1990): 
Whether a contact is ambiguous is a question of law 
. . . Moreover, the trial court must determine 
"whether a contract is ambiguous . . • before it takes 
any evidence in clarification." It follows, therefore, 
that if the contract is clear on its face, the trial 
court need not — and in fact should not -- consider 
evidence of a contrary meaning. (Emphasis added.) 
See also, Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 
1199, 1200 (Utah 1983). 
It is interesting to note that Point I of the Appellees1 
brief is entitled "Plaintiff Appellant (sic) Misconstrues the 
Parol Evidence Rule." However, after setting out two quotations 
from a secondary source, the Appellees failed to relate the 
argument either to the Appellants1 brief or to the facts of this 
case (Appellees' brief at 10). Because the Appellees have failed 
to relate Point I of their brief either to the Appellants1 
argument or the facts, this Court should strike that portion of 
the Appellees' brief. This Court has held that it will not 
address issues for which there is no argument or analysis. 
D.D.Z. v. Molerway Freight Lines, 880 P. 2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In Point II of Appellees' brief, the respondents argue that 
the trial court properly allowed the introduction of parol 
evidence to determine whether there was an integrated agreement 
(Appellees' brief at 10-16). In support of the proposition, 
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Appellees cite Corbin on Contracts, 582 p. 444-447 (Appellees' 
brief at 10-11). However, even the authorities cited by the 
Appellees require the trial court, after hearing the relevant 
evidence, to determine if the contract is integrated and 
unambiguous and therefore whether parol evidence will be 
admitted. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985). 
As clearly indicated by the Court in Eie v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981): 
The trial court must first determine if the contract 
is integrated, i.e., an agreement "where the parties 
thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final and 
complete expression of the agreement. An integration 
is the writing or writings so adopted." 
Unless the trial court determines that the contract is not 
integrated or that it is ambiguous, 
. . . The parol evidence rule excludes evidence of 
terms in addition to those in the agreement, thus 
excluding "contemporaneous conversations, statements, 
or representations offered for the purpose of varying 
or adding to the terms of an integrated contract . . . 
There is a rebuttable presumption that a written 
contract which appears to complete and certain is 
integrated . . . Courts are not obligated to rewrite 
contracts entered into by the parties dealing at arms* 
length, to relieve one party from a bargain later 
regretted, simply on supposed equitable principles." 
Webb v, R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1991); 
Colonial Leasing Co., v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1986); Hal Taylor Assocs., v. Unionamerican, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743, 749 (Utah 1982). 
There is no question that the Appellees have conceded that 
the trial court is required to make definitive findings of fact 
with sufficient detail so that the basis of the ultimate 
conclusion can be understood. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance 
Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). As noted by the Court in Jensen 
v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), adequate findings 
are those that (1) are sufficiently detailed, (2) include enough 
facts to disclose the process through which the ultimate 
conclusion is reached, (3) indicate the processes logical and 
properly supported, and (4) are not clearly erroneous. 
Having determined the obligation of the trial court to make 
definitive findings, the Appellees argue only that the trial 
court may hear parol evidence in order to make a determination of 
whether or not the contract is integrated and unambiguous. The 
Appellees do not cite any authority or even contend that the 
trial court, in a contract case, can avoid the determination of 
whether or not the contract is integrated (Appellees' brief at 
10-16). 
Having determined that the trial court had an obligation to 
make specific findings regarding the nature of the contract and 
the admissability of parol evidence, the Appellants argue that 
the trial court failed to make the necessary findings regarding 
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the integration of the contract and the admissability of parol 
evidence to modify the same. The Appellees1 brief is entirely 
silent on that issue. Appellees do not contend that the trial 
court made the necessary findings. 
It is clear that the failure of the trial court to make 
findings on all material issues is reversible error. Epstein v. 
Epstein, 741 P.2d 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). As noted by the 
Court in Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 
1983), the findings must clearly indicate the "mind of the 
court", and the failure to enter adequate findings requires the 
judgment be vacated. 
The facts indicate that the parties signed two agreements. 
The first, designated as a Sales Agreement is dated September 9, 
1988 and contains the following important language: 
. . . 2. The contractor has inspected the site . . . 
and has accepted the site in its present condition for 
work he is to do under this contract. 
3. The contractor agrees to construction of said 
residence and improvements and to provide and 
furnish all labor and materials required for such 
construction and the completion thereof strictly in 
accordance with the plans and specifications approved 
and signed by the owner and contractor and made a part 
of this Agreement, and in accordance with applicable 
laws and ordinances affecting such construction. The 
work to be done by the contractor shall include, but 
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shall not be limited to, all excavating, sheetrock, 
tile and/or linoleum work, iron work, sheet metal work, 
glass, painting, plumbing, heating, electrical work, 
cash allowances, etc. all complete as specified in the 
plans and specifications. 
4. The owner, for and in consideration of the full, 
complete and faithful performance of this Agreement by 
the contractor and his payment of all bills incurred in 
the construction, agrees to pay or cause to be paid to 
the contractor the sum of One Hundred Seventeen 
Thousand One Hundred Dollars ($117,100.00). of which 
amount ($117,100.00) Dollars, consisting of a loan with 
American Savings and Loan Association, and sash 
deposited by the owner, shall be placed with said 
lender for disbursement as the work progresses. 
5. No changes in the plans or specifications shall be 
make by the contractor without the written order of the 
owner and approval of the American Savings and Loan 
Association. The amount to be paid by the owner or 
allowed by the contractor by virtue of such extras or 
changes, as agreed by the owner and contractor shall 
be stated in such order, and payment shall be make to 
the contractor at the time said extra work or change is 
authorized. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 5. 
The second Agreement, designated as the Building Loan 
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Agreement and Assignment of Account, dated September 21, 1988, 
required the completion of the home within six months from the 
date of the Agreement, and required appropriate draw requests. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 9, Addendum No. 2. 
The Appellees do not take issue with the Appellants' 
contention that the trial court did not make any appropriate 
rulings regarding the integration of the contracts or provide a 
factual basis for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to vary 
the terms of the written agreement. The only reference to the 
contracts in the Memorandum Decision are as follows: 
. . . 4. There were many changes made in accordance 
with the contract in writing, many others appeared to 
be verbal in nature but agreed to by both parties as to 
what those changes are, the evidence is contradictory 
. . . 
As to plaintiffs' allegation of failing to construct 
the residence in accordance with the plans and 
specifications, there is no question but what he did 
not, but the plans and specifications were changed many 
times both in writing and verbally and orally by the 
plaintiffs and many times through the plaintiffs' son 
Clay who was the foreman for the defendants' 
construction company . . . . 
R. 355-360, Addendum No. 5, Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 15, R. 
428-443, Addendum No. 6. 
The intent of the trial court is unclear from its rulings. 
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The Findings of Fact incorporate the language from the Memorandum 
Decision that there was significant disagreement between the 
parties (R. 440). However, as with the Memorandum Decision, the 
findings fail to explain the court's repudiation of the clear and 
unambiguous contract signed by the parties. 
It well may be that the trial court simply failed to 
consider the legal issue regarding integration, ambiguity and the 
admissability of parol evidence. Judge Christofferson is a 
retired senior judge. The trial was held on August 24 through 
26, 1992 (R. 178-183). The court's Memorandum Decision was not 
signed by Judge Christofferson until June 1, 1993, nearly nine 
months later (R. 354-360). 
It is unclear whether the trial judge made a legal error 
with regard to the applicable law. The record simply does not 
disclose whether Judge Christofferson appreciated the fact that 
parol evidence could not be used to modify the terms of an 
integrated contract and that explicit rulings were necessary in 
that regard. 
The actual language contained in the Memorandum Decision is 
not very helpful. The court found that there were changes made 
in accordance with the contract but also found that there were 
"many others appeared to be verbal in nature but agreed to by 
both parties as to what those changes are, the evidence is 
contradictory." (R. 335-360, Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 15, R. 
428-443). It is not clear from that language whether the court 
found the written contracts to be integrated or not. Although 
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the court refers to verbal changes, the court failed to find any 
verbal contracts. Instead, the court found that the evidence was 
contradictory as to the verbal changes. 
The Appellants recognize that the trial court's 
interpretation of the words of the parties' contract is reviewed 
by the Appellate Court as a question of law under a correctness 
standard. Likewise if the trial court makes factual findings 
about the intent of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, the 
appellate court's review is strictly limited. Hansen v. Green 
River Group, 748 P. 2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Zions First 
National Bank v. National American Title Insurance, 749 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1988). In this case, the trial court did not make any 
rulings, as a matter of law, on the contract of the parties and 
certainly did not make any factual findings regarding ambiguity, 
the intent of the parties or the existence of subsequent oral 
contracts. Accordingly, the only alternative is to vacate the 
judgment in order to allow specific factual findings upon which 
legal conclusions can be made. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE INTRODUCTION 
OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO MODIFY THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
A. The Contracts Executed by the Parties are Integrated and 
Unambiguous. 
The Appellants contend that the documents signed by the 
parties constituted an integrated and unambiguous contract. 
There is a rebuttable presumption that a written contract which 
appears to be complete and certain is integrated. Eie v. St. 
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Benedictf s Hospital, supra; Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 
supra; Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
The Appellees contend that inasmuch as the Appellants must 
point to more than one document, there can be no integration 
(Appellees' brief at 10-12). The argument misconstrues the 
facts. The first agreement executed by the parties was a Sales 
Agreement dated September 9, 1988. The second agreement was 
executed because of the involvement of a lending institution. It 
was designated as a Building Loan Agreement and Assignment of 
Account, dated September 21, 1988. There is nothing unusual in 
having an agreement between an owner of property and a builder 
and then a separate agreement relating to the loan funds to build 
the home. There is nothing that is inconsistent or contradictory 
in the two agreements. The Sales Agreement clearly outlined the 
responsibilities of the builder and the method by which changes 
to the contract could be made: 
• . . 2. The contractor has inspected the site . . . 
and has accepted the site in its present condition for 
work he is to do under this contract. 
3. The contractor agrees to construction of said 
residence and improvements and to provide and 
furnish all labor and materials required for such 
construction and the completion thereof strictly in 
accordance with the plans and specifications approved 
and signed by the owner and contractor and made a part 
of this Agreement, and in accordance with applicable 
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laws and ordinances affecting such construction. The 
work to be done by the contractor shall include, but 
shall not be limited to, all excavating, sheetrock, 
tile and/or linoleum work, iron work, sheet metal work, 
glass, painting, plumbing, heating, electrical work, 
cash allowances, etc. all complete as specified in the 
plans and specifications. 
4. The owner, for and in consideration of the full, 
complete and faithful performance of this Agreement by 
the contractor and his payment of all bills incurred in 
the construction, agrees to pay or cause to be paid to 
the contractor the sum of One Hundred Seventeen 
Thousand One Hundred Dollars ($117,100.00). of which 
amount ($117,100.00) Dollars, consisting of a loan with 
American Savings and Loan Association, and sash 
deposited by the owner, shall be placed with said 
lender for disbursement as the work progresses. 
5. No changes in the plans or specifications shall be 
make by the contractor without the written order of the 
owner and approval of the American Savings and Loan 
Association. The amount to be paid by the owner or 
allowed by the contractor by virtue of such extras or 
changes, as agreed by the owner and contractor shall 
be stated in such order, and payment shall be made to 
the contractor at the time said extra work or change is 
authorized. 
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Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 5. 
Appellees do not contend that there is anything about the 
agreements that is ambiguous. Instead, the Appellees argue that 
"it is clear that there were other matters which the parties 
agreed on that were not included in any written documents however 
none the less were a part of the agreement by the parties." 
(Appellees' brief at 13). To substantiate their claim, the 
Appellees point to only one example. They cite the fact that it 
was the intent of the parties that the home be heated by 
hydronics yet the hydronic heating system was not included on the 
plans. 
The Appellees have failed to review the documents and 
testimony in the case. The heating of the home and specifically, 
the installation of hydronic heat was a task to be performed by 
the Lowes, the Appellants herein. The Sales Agreement of 
September 9, 1988 requires the contractor to perform the work 
related to "all excavating, rough grating, concrete work, 
masonry, lumbar, carpentry, interior trim, labor, sheet rock, 
pile and/or linoleum work, iron work, sheet metal work." 
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 5). The contract explicitly omitted any 
responsibility by the contractor for the heating. 
The Plaintiff Mrs. Lowe testified that the installation of 
the hydronic heat was their responsibility and that the 
installation of the hydronic heat caused no delays on the 
project (T. at 47-49). The Plaintiff, Mr. Lowe testified that 
the heating was the responsibility of the Plaintiffs and any 
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excess over the budgeted amount would be their responsibility (T. 
at 109-110). Gilbert Hayes, contractor and the person drawing 
the plans for the home, testified likewise (T. at 268-269). 
Steven Anderson, a brother to the Plaintiff Beverly Lowe, 
testified that he installed the hydronic system for the Lowes and 
that the job was completed without any major hold-ups (T. at 337-
344). Even the Defendant, Kyle Golightly, testified that the 
heating was the responsibility of the Lowes (T. at 503-505). 
In summary, the responsibility for the installation of the 
hydronic heat was that of the Plaintiffs. The heating and 
plumbing was contractually delegated to the Plaintiffs and 
omitted from the duties and tasks of the contractor. Although 
Mr. Golightly, one of the Appellees, contends that the 
installation of the hydronic heat caused some delay on the job, 
there was no issue raised by the parties that the responsibility 
for the heating and plumbing was omitted from the contracts were 
the subject to the subsequent oral agreement. Thus, the only 
example alluded to by the Appellees to establish the non-
integration of the contract has no merit. 
It should also be noted that the Appellees argue that the 
parol evidence rule allows the introduction of any oral or 
written agreements entered into between the parties subsequent to 
the original contract (Appellees' brief at 15). Although the 
parol evidence rule may allow the introduction of subsequent oral 
or written agreements, that is not the issue in this case. As 
detailed in the Appellants1 original Statement of Facts, the 
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contract signed by the parties specifically restricted any 
changes in the plans or specifications for the building of the 
house in question, to be in writing, signed by the owners. 
Appellees failed to cite any evidence where in the parties voided 
or negated that portion of the Sales Agreement of September 9, 
1988. 
B. Improper Extrinsic Evidence was Received by the Trial 
Court. 
The Appellees contend in Point III of their brief that the 
parties agreed to the changes of the plans and specifications 
during construction that substituted a subsequent contract for 
that of the original Sales Agreement (Appellees' brief at 16). 
The Appellees continue by stating: 
There were several incidences at trial where both the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant agreed and the court so 
found where changes were made to the plains and 
specifications that were incorporated into the original 
contract. (See paragraph 11 of the Statement of 
Facts. ) 
Appellees' brief at 16. 
A quick review of paragraph 11 of the Appellees' Statement 
of Facts does not refer to "several incidences" of subsequent 
agreement between the parties that is inconsistent with the 
original agreement. Instead, paragraph 11 of the Appellees' 
Statement of Facts is simply a verbatim recitation of Beverly 
Lowe's testimony that she would make comments to the contractor 
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regarding aesthetics. There is no citation to the record 
revealing any agreements, increased costs or formal changes. 
The record reveals that the Plaintiffs signed only four 
change orders. The first was on November 9, 1988 for $747.55 
requiring an extension of the gas line, a galvanized window well 
and the cost of additional foundation. The second change order 
is dated October 19, 1988 for $160.00 to complete a lot survey 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 14). Those changes were paid by check 
dated november 15, 1988 in the amount of $907.55 (T. 92, line 1 
to 93, Line 24). The third change order was dated December 3, 
1988 in the amount of $960.00 for the removal of trash. The last 
change order was dated March 5, 1989 in the amount of $1,977.50 
for additional concrete work (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 14). 
The evidence also establishes that the Plaintiffs did 
request a loft in the south end of the home, a two step rise in 
the family room, a drop ceiling in the front room, and an outlet 
in the dining room. All of the minor changes were 
inconsequential and in keeping with the design contemplated by 
the plans (T. 60, Line 7 to 64, Line 7; 86, Lines 1 to 20; 87, 
Line 21 to 89, Line 18). The Plaintiffs agreed to pay for all 
overages for expenses incurred in extras involving cabinets, 
vanities and floor coverings (T. 86, Line 17 to 87, Line 20). 
In sum, the Appellees have failed to establish any ambiguity 
in the original contract or evidence that the contract did not 
embody the final intent of the Plaintiffs and Defendants with 
regard to the construction of the home. Although there were 
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inconsequential changes to the plans, the major changes were 
incorporated into change orders as required by the contract 
(Appellees' brief at 5-7, 15-16). 
With a clear background on the evidence in the case, there 
is simply no basis to support the trial court's ruling as to the 
admissibility of key testimony. As outlined in the original 
Appellants' brief, the Defendants were allowed to testify 
regarding changes that were not memorialized by the written 
approvals of the Plaintiffs or the bank (T. 503-504). 
Even though the Defendants accepted the site for the 
construction of the home and although the contract required them 
to assume responsibility for all excavating, the Defendants were 
allowed to testify regarding the Plaintiffs alleged 
responsibility for ditch and canal problems (T. 507-509). 
Although there were only four signed change orders, the 
Defendants were allowed to testify to over fifty-six changes to 
the contract that were not memorialized to signed change orders. 
Other examples of the improper parol evidence are contained in 
Point II of the Appellants' original brief. 
One other point should be made. The Appellants had a right 
to insist in certain change orders. There is no evidence that 
the Appellants waived their right to have all changes reduced to 
writing and signed. As noted by the Court in Soter's Inc. v. 
Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993): 
Waiver requires three elements: (1) an existing right, 
benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; 
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and, (3) an intention to relinquish the right. 
There is simply no evidence that would support a waiver or 
modification of the requirement for written change orders. 
POINT III: THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE AND ARE THEREFORE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
A. The Legal Tests for Challenging the Sufficiency of the 
Trial Court's Findings. 
The Appellee agrees with the test outlined in the 
Appellants' brief (Appellees' brief at 17). It should be noted 
that a trial court's actual finding is erroneous if there is 
insufficient evidence to support the finding or if the findings 
are not articulated with sufficient detail so that the basis of 
the ultimate conclusion can be understood. Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). The evidence that 
must support a trial court's finding must be substantial, 
competent and admissible. Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 
1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Additionally, Findings of Fact are 
clearly erroneous if it can be shown that they are induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. Interiors Contracting v. Smith, 881 
P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
B. The Findings Contained in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision are not Supported by Admissible Evidence and are 
Clearly Erroneous. 
In Findings numbered 3 and 4, the court referred to the 
significant disagreement and contradiction in the testimony of 
the parties and witnesses (R. 440). The Appellees cite testimony 
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from the Plaintiffs relating to the areas of construction over 
which they were to maintain control. Although there is some 
difference between the testimony, it was consistent with the 
terms of the original Sales Contract executed by the parties. As 
noted in the Appellants' original brief, most of the testimony 
that was contradictory and inconsistent was testimony that 
intended to vary the terms of the unambiguous and integrated 
agreements signed by the parties. If the trial court had 
properly excluded the inadmissable parol evidence, much of the 
contradictory testimony would have been eliminated. The finding 
of the court is based therefore on an erroneous view of the law. 
The Appellants' position is bolstered by the Appellees' argument 
regarding the Extension Agreement. The parties executed an 
Extension Agreement on March 22, 1989. The clear language of the 
agreement allowed additional time, to June 20, 1989 for the 
payment of the construction loan. The document neither dealt 
with nor extended the time for the home to be constructed 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 21; T. 189 to 192; Appellees' brief at 
19-20). The trial court's allowance of parol evidence to 
interpret and modify an unambiguous contract is clear error. 
Findings 5 and 6 dealt with the involvement of the 
Plaintiffs' son, Clay. The trial court found that because Clay 
assumed a leading and responsible role, he was an agent for the 
Defendants as well as the Plaintiffs. The court found that 
changes in the construction based upon conversations between Clay 
and the Plaintiffs (R. 439-440). The erroneous assumption made 
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by the trial court is that the parties should be relieved of the 
clear contractual obligation to have all change orders in writing 
and signed by the respective parties. Findings 5 and 6 are a 
classic example of the trial court allowing parol evidence to 
alter the terms of the contract without ever finding that the 
contract was not integrated or was not ambiguous. After all, the 
reason for the requirement of written change orders is to prevent 
subsequent bickering over the transaction. Further, as noted in 
the original brief, the Defendant Golightly never claimed that 
Clay exceeded his authority or acted outside the course and scope 
of his employment. Additionally, the Defendants made no claim 
for contribution or indemnification against Clay. If the 
Defendants contended that Clay acted improperly, their remedy was 
to preserve that issue into pleadings. 
Finding number 7 relates to changes that were not reflected 
on the plans (R. 439). As detailed herein, there were four 
written change orders and some inconsequential changes. However, 
the issue of what oral changes were accepted by the parties is 
once again complicated by the trial court's failure to make 
rulings with regard to the admissibility of parol evidence. 
Finding number 8 relates to the areas over which the 
respective parties may maintain control (R. 438-439). Finding 
number 8 is another example of the significance of the trial 
court's failure to rule on parol evidence. The Sales Agreement 
clearly recited the areas over which the Defendants would be 
responsible and the areas over which the Plaintiffs would retain 
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control. Despite the explicit categorization of responsibility, 
the court allowed the Defendants to testify to a delegation of 
responsibilities contrary to the terms of the written contract. 
Findings 9 and 10 relate to delay on the project that are so 
distorted because of the breadth the witnesses were given to 
testify as to have no real impact on the conclusions in this case 
(R. 430-438). 
Finding number 11 causes the same problems as recited above. 
Finding 11 states as follows: 
There were many changes made in accordance with the 
contract in writing while many other changes were 
made as a result of verbal requests and agreed to by 
both parties as to what the changes would be. These 
changes also caused delay to the job. 
The Finding is not specific enough to detail the changes the 
court was referring to in order to allow the litigants or this 
Court to comment. Obviously, if the verbal requests were simply 
those inconsequential changes referred to above, there is no 
significance. However, if the court is attributing major 
alterations of the contract to verbal changes, an analysis would 
have to be made. Because the Finding is neither clear nor 
sufficiently detailed, no substantive response could be made. 
In Finding number 12, the trial court found that the 
Extension Agreement was intended to extend the time in which the 
Defendants had to complete the construction of the home. Again, 
the court allowed extrinsic evidence to vary the clear and 
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unambiguous terms of the Extension Agreement without making any 
finding as to ambiguity or non-integration• 
Critically, in Findings numbered 13, 14 and 15 the court 
found that the Defendants failed to construct the residence in 
accordance with the original plans and specifications (R. 435-
437). In essence, the court found that the Defendant had failed 
to comply with the terms of the contract but refused to grant the 
Plaintiffs any relief based upon the existence of modifications 
to the contract. The error of the trial court can clearly be 
seen. The trial court failed to find the original agreements 
ambiguous but still allowed oral testimony to vary the terms of 
the same. The court, without specifying what oral agreements 
were being found by the court to exist, took away all relief from 
the Plaintiffs. 
The Findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous both 
because there is an inadequate factual basis and because they are 
skewed by an erroneous view of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to comply with the requirements of 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Findings 
made by the court were not sufficiently detailed to provide the 
litigants or this Court with an understanding of the trial 
court's methodology. The trial court simply failed to make 
findings relative to the integration and ambiguity of the 
contract signed by the parties. Additionally, the court made no 
explicit rulings on the Parol Evidence Rule as applied to the 
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facts of this case. 
The contracts signed by the parties were integrated and 
unambiguous. The contracts clearly required all changes to the 
plans and specifications to be in writing and signed by the 
parties. The contravention of the clear language of the 
contracts, the trial court improperly allowed extrinsic evidence 
to alter and modify the terms of the original contract. 
The Findings of Fact in this case are clearly erroneous both 
because there is an inadequate evidentiary basis to support the 
same and because the Findings are based upon an erroneous view 
of the law. The evidence that does support the Findings is 
evidence that should have been ruled inadmissible. 
The Appellants are entitled to an Order vacation the 
judgment in this case and for entry of a Judgment consistent with 
the law. 
DATED this day of January, 1995. 
Michael J. Petro, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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